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a b s t r a c t
How efficient is the targeting of foreign aid to populations in need? A long literature has focused on the
impacts of foreign aid, but much rarer are studies that examine how such aid is allocated within countries. We examine the extent to which donors efficiently respond to exogenous budget shocks by shifting
resources toward needier districts within a given country, as predicted by theory. We use recently geocoded data on the World Bank’s aid in 23 countries that crossed the lower-middle income threshold
between 1995 and 2010 and thus experienced sharp aid reductions. We measure locations’ need along
a number of dimensions, including nighttime lights emissions, population density, conflict exposure,
and child mortality. We find little evidence that aid project siting is increasingly concentrated in
worse-off areas as budgets shrink; the only exception appears to be a growing share of funding in more
conflict-affected areas. We further analyze the relationship of health aid to child mortality measures in
six key countries, again finding little evidence of efficient responses to budget shocks. Taken together,
these results suggest that large efficiency gains may be possible in the distribution of aid from the
World Bank and other donors.
Ó 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

1. Introduction
How well directed are foreign aid resources toward the needs of
the populations they aim to benefit? In particular, how efficiently
are foreign aid organizations allocating resources within developing countries? Research over the past several decades has primarily explored the degree to which donors, particularly bilateral
donors, allocate aid to specific countries based on various political
and economic factors (e.g., colonial ties, political alignment in
international institutions, trade ties). However, little is known
about the degree to which donors succeed in directing development resources within each country toward different locations in
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ways that maximize welfare. Recent work has shown that, at least
in the cross-section, aid allocations are positively correlated with
wealth (Öhler, Negre, Smets, Massari, & Bogetić,2019; Öhler
et al., 2019) and child health (Kotsadam, Østby, Rustad, Tollefsen,
& Urdal, 2018), and that aid project allocations sometimes – but
not always – respond to political and ethnic motives (Jablonski,
2014; Brazys, Elkink, & Kelly, 2017; Dreher et al., 2019). Yet determining how efficiently the vast majority of aid is allocated remains
an open question.
We develop a simple theoretical model of efficient aid allocation – where ‘‘efficiency” is defined as an allocation that maximizes
overall welfare – across districts within a recipient country. The
model predicts that if donors allocate aid efficiently, the share of
aid going to needier areas should increase when the overall budget
available for the country shrinks. We draw on these insights to
derive empirical tests of allocative efficiency, accounting for potential differences in costs of delivering aid across areas that exhibit
higher or lower need. We do this by using geo-referenced data
on the activities of the World Bank (WB) and measures of underlying conditions at both the district- and region-level within developing countries. A key challenge in empirically assessing the
efficiency of aid allocation is that the characteristics of each country’s regions are not randomly assigned. Long-term causes of differences in characteristics are likely to be correlated with
omitted factors (such as institutional quality, e.g., Michalopoulos
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tions and micro- or household-scale allocations). Briggs (2017)
explores the cross-sectional relationship between wealth (measured in household surveys) and aid projects funded by the WB
and African Development Bank (ADB), finding that wealthier areas
are disproportionately funded. Briggs (2018a) reinforces this finding using more granular units of analysis, and Briggs (2018b)
extends the analysis to a wide variety of donors and finds that
aid projects tend to be co-located with the rich in Nigeria, Senegal,
and Uganda.1 Similarly, Öhler et al. (2019) find little consistent evidence that WB aid is targeted toward subnational regions with
higher shares of the population in the bottom 40% of the income distribution. In Nigeria, Kotsadam et al. (2018) find that aid from multiple sources is disproportionately located in areas with initially
lower child mortality rates. Nunnenkamp, Öhler, and Andrés
(2017) study WB project locations across Indian districts, finding
only very weak evidence of any correlation with poverty or other
need measures.
Taking a political economy approach, Jablonski (2014) finds that
within Kenya, WB and ADB projects are disproportionately located
in constituencies with higher incumbent vote shares, while
Caldeira (2011) show that government finance in Senegal is allocated disproportionately to swing electoral districts, with little evidence of equity considerations. Song, Brazys, and Vadlamannati
(2021) show that the political empowerment of local groups has
influenced the allocation of education aid from the World Bank
in India. Dreher et al. (2019) show that Chinese foreign aid to African nations is disproportionately provided to a national leader’s
home or co-ethnic region, but that WB projects do not exhibit such
favoritism. Other studies document similar political biases even in
the allocation of humanitarian and emergency aid (e.g., Lio
Rosvold, 2020; Eichenauer, Fuchs, Kunze, & Strobl, 2020). Perhaps
the only finding indicating pro-poor targeting is from Bendavid
(2014), who finds that increases in health aid to a country lead
to larger drops in child mortality among the poorest households.
There is also evidence of favoritism in the allocation of government
grants in Indonesia (Gonschorek, 2021).
These findings comport with the observations of interested
stakeholders who have noted that many major aid programs often
fail to adequately incorporate equity concerns and, as such, may
not reach the most vulnerable and marginalized populations
within recipient countries (e.g., Chi, Bulage, & Østby, 2019). Studies
that do find that aid responds to need are limited to specific sectors
(Bendavid, 2014). However, many of the above-mentioned studies
focus on only one or a handful of countries (e.g., Caldeira, 2011;
Jablonski, 2014; Kotsadam et al., 2018; Nunnenkamp et al., 2017)
or are limited to Africa (Briggs, 2017; Dreher et al., 2019). More
recent work has helped remedy this problem by expanding the
spatial domain under consideration (e.g., Öhler et al., 2019;
Briggs, 2021). Indeed, while recent studies have expanded the list
of countries included in their analyses, the temporal domains of
these studies remain limited. For instance, Öhler et al. (2019) focus
on the 2004–2014 period but aggregate their measures into a
cross-sectional regional analysis. Briggs (2021) studies the 1995–
2005 period, though uses only nighttime light luminosity as a
proxy for local wealth, which (Öhler et al.2 (2019)) point out is a
noisy measure for poverty. In sum, though existing findings are
somewhat mixed, the preponderance of evidence appears to suggest that subnational aid allocation tends not to respond to various
metrics of need within countries or that it is driven by political
factors.
Our goal is to build on existing studies in a few ways. First, we
expand on the scope of existing work in terms of data coverage.

& Papaioannou, 2013), while short-term causes elicit a narrow set
of donor responses (such as emergency aid in response to disasters
or violence, e.g., Bezerra & Paul, 2016).
To overcome these challenges, we exploit exogenous variation
in the total amount of aid that the WB can provide to each country,
recently detailed by Galiani, Knack, Lixin Colin, and Zou (2017).
One of the largest and most sophisticated donors, the World Bank
has provided more than $1.6 trillion in aid since 1947, following
exacting processes of project preparation, review, and implementation. We compare differences in aid allocations across high and
low-need areas under varying total aid budgets. We find little evidence of changes driven by aid shocks. This is true for a variety of
measures of aid, as well as for a range of subnational need indicators, including nighttime lights, population density, remoteness,
and a composite measure generated via principal components
analysis that incorporates these proxies along with a variety of
other features. The only exception we identify is a substantial
increase in project siting and funding in districts where baseline
conflict fatalities were highest. In a subset of countries, we assess
whether health aid projects are more likely to be located in areas
with initial higher child mortality after the Bank’s funding shrinks,
again finding no such evidence. We check that differences in project implementation costs across more or less needy areas (which
could mute any response to differences in need) also do not materialize. Other robustness checks bear out our primary findings.
We conclude that the World Bank – one of the leading aid institutions – does not appear to direct aid resources within countries
towards the areas with the greatest need. These findings suggest
that the Bank’s subnational targeting diverges from the organization’s stated goals. We cannot rule out that the Bank’s targeting
does efficiently reflect other, implicit aims (for example, by
extracting key national-level policy reforms from domestic governments in exchange for politically motivated aid allocations to less
poor areas). Nonetheless, in showing the degree to which aid flows
primarily to less poor subnational areas, our results suggest the
implicit gains from these trade-offs would have to be very large
to be make the overall distribution of benefits pro-poor.
Our paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we discuss the
related literature, and in Section 3 we provide a conceptual framework and generate testable predictions. In Section 4, we describe
our data and lay out our empirical methodology, presenting results
in Section 5. We provide robustness checks in Section 6. In Section 7, we focus our scope more narrowly on health aid and need
measures. Finally, we consider whether there are offsetting geographic differences in costs in Section 8, before offering conclusions in Section 9.

2. Literature review
A large literature has examined the impacts of aid on a wide
variety of economic, political, and social variables at the crossnational and, increasingly, at the subnational level (e.g., Crost,
Felter, & Johnston, 2014; Rajan & Subramanian, 2008; Rajan &
Subramanian, 2011; Clemens, Redelet, & Bhavnani, 2012; Galiani
et al., 2017; Marty, Dolan, Leu, & Runfola, 2017; Bazzi, Bhavnani,
Clemens, & Radelet, 2012; Dreher et al., 2019; Isaksson &
Kotsadam, 2018; Isaksson & Kotsadam, 2018; Knutsen &
Kotsadam, 2020). Our work builds on the much scarcer but growing literature examining how aid resources are allocated within
countries. A related literature concentrates on the efficiency of
what might be considered micro-targeting, i.e., allocations to
households within villages (c.f., Alatas, Banerjee, Hanna, Olken, &
Tobias, 2012; Baird, McIntosh, & Özler, 2013). Our paper complements these literatures by exploring the efficiency of allocations
at the meso-scale (i.e., between macro- or country-scale alloca-

1
However, there may be important differences across different types of donors. For
instance, Dipendra (2020) shows that bilateral and multilateral aid targets those most
in need better than aid from (international) nongovernmental organizations in Nepal.
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tional non-linearity in substitutability of a and x, which could magnify or dampen responses. We otherwise maintain the same
assumptions as our general setup, and thus for ð@u=@x > 0Þ we
require b > 0, and for @ 2 u=@a2 < 0, and @ 2 u=@x2 < 0, we require
q < 1.2
We can then pin down interior solutions3 for optimal public services a1 and a2 as a function of initial conditions and the overall
budget:

The study most similar to ours is Briggs (2021), which uses nighttime luminosity as a proxy for local need. We significantly expand
the set of measures of that serve as proxies for local need in the
analysis below. Second, we adopt an approach recently developed
in the cross-national aid allocation literature that attempts leverage exogenous variation in aid budgets to draw better inferences
about the relationship between need and allocation given an aid
shock. Specifically, we examine whether a variety of potential
proxies for local need become stronger or weaker predictors of
aid allocation when a country becomes ineligible for receiving
IDA assistance, following Galiani et al. (2017). Before outlining that
approach, however, we develop a simple model of the aid allocation process to derive clear predictions.


a1 ¼

1þ

ccðx1 Þ

1

c ð x2 Þ

bðcx2  x1 Þ þ

cB
c ð x2 Þ

bðcx1  x2 Þ þ

cB
c ð x1 Þ

and


a2 ¼

3. Conceptual framework

1þ

ccðx2 Þ

1

c ð x1 Þ
1

where c ¼ ccððxx12 ÞÞq1 .

3.1. Motivating model

We can then show that, if the marginal costs of public services
are different across the two regions (such that cðx1 Þ – cðx2 Þ), the
difference between a1 and a2 will change as the total budget constraint changes:

Like Collier and Paul (2001) and Collier and Paul (2002), we
begin with a model of optimal aid allocation for the sake of developing a baseline against which we can compare actual allocation
patterns. Our goal is to link our understanding of aid efficiency to
the workhorse choice models and to motivate the empirical analysis (rather than making a theory contribution). Thus, we consider a
simple model of public resource allocation across two different
regions with varying levels of underlying need. A development
agency or social planner aims to maximize the welfare in these
regions, subject to a traditional budget constraint:

@ða2  a1 Þ
–0
@B
The direction of the response will be ambiguous and depend on
cðx1 Þ
the ratio of costs (i.e., whether cðx
is greater than or less than 1). As
2Þ

we discuss in the ensuing sections, there are good reasons to
cðx1 Þ
is either greater than or less than
believe either is true (i.e., that cðx
2Þ

1). We thus generate the following testable prediction:(H1 ) The difference in the levels of aid funding provided to regions with worse
conditions and those with better conditions should grow or shrink
when total aid for the country shrinks, depending on the ratio of
marginal costs across the regions
Here, we also consider the special case in which cðx1 Þ ¼ cðx2 Þ. As
we show below, the difference between a2 and a1 will no longer
respond to changes in the total budget. We therefore instead consider how the ratio of a2 and a1 responds to the total budget, thus
again allowing us to generate testable predictions.
In this setting of equal marginal costs across the two regions,

uða1 ; x1 Þ þ uða2 ; x2 Þ
s.t.

B ¼ a1  cðx1 Þ þ a2  cðx2 Þ
Where
ai : allocation of public services to area i.
x1 : conditions in area i, with higher values indicating better
conditions.
uð:Þ is utility in area i, @u=@a > 0; @u=@x > 0; @ 2 u=@a2 < 0, and
@ 2 u=@x2 < 0.
B: Total budget available. c(.): unit cost of services, which may
vary by conditions in area i (based on an implicit production
function)
For our example, say that region 2 is initially worse off than
region 1 (x2 < x1 ).
In general, one can show that if the budget constraint is exactly
satisfied, donors will allocate public services so that the ratio of
marginal utilities across the two regions exactly equals the ratio
of marginal costs:

a2  a1 ¼ bðcx1  x2 Þ > 0
and the differences in the levels of public services going to the
regions are constant, even as total budget rise and fall. Simply
put, the public services simply compensate for any differences in
initial conditions, magnified or dampened by the constant b. However, in this situation, we can still generate testable predictions a
the ratios of the services going to these regions will not remain constant when budgets fall, as

a2
2bðcx1  x2 Þ
¼1þ
a1
bðcx2  x1 Þ þ cðBx Þ

@uða1 ; x1 Þ
cðx1 Þ
@a1
¼
@uða2 ; x2 Þ
cðx2 Þ
@a2

2

and thus the response of this ratio to changes in B will be
a

@ a2
1

To make progress on the responsiveness of the ratio of marginal
utilities to shifting budgets, we need to make some assumptions on
the functional form of the utility function (specifically, on the separability of public services and conditions). Say that public services
and conditions are substitutes, so that donor and government
efforts can (at least partially) offset deficient conditions. For our
purposes, say that

uða; xÞ ¼ ða þ bxÞ

@B

¼ 2bðcx1  x2 Þð1Þbðcx2  x1 Þ þ



B 2
1
<0
cðx2 Þ
cðx2 Þ

2
An alternative approach might entail using this non-homothetic utility function
to first show that the ratio of aid to different regions is not constant with respect to
the total aid budget, and then explore how the slope of the resulting income
expansion path varies with respect to conditions.
3
Corner solutions are possible in which all aid is allocated to the region with the
highest need, but in practice in our data, there are no countries in which all aid is
provided only to the highest need location.

q

where b and q are constants that shape the substitutability in a and
x and curvature of the utility function. One could introduce addi3
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of fiscal transfers to lower income regions and find that, among
these regions, only those with sufficient human capital and good
enough institutions are able to turn transfers into faster growth
in incomes and investment. However, even in this context, the
authors do not find negative impacts of fiscal transfers in lower
income regions. Moreover, the nature of these fiscal transfers in
the European context – direct governmental transfers to subnational administrative units – are quite different than many foreign
aid projects. Taken together, we argue there is little consistent evidence that indicates that conditions and aid allocations are complementary in terms of utility.
A second major aspect of our approach is that it considers the
perspective of a single donor rather than multiple donors with
potentially competing or complementary objectives, or domestic
governments carrying out their own agendas. While a game theoretic approach may be a worthwhile direction for further
research, our focus here is on understanding how one major
donor determines its own priorities.4 Our choice-theoretic focus
on one major donor does omit the possibility that other donors
or domestic governments respond to the Bank’s allocations by targeting the neediest regions and thus generate aggregate distributions of aid that are pro-poor, but this is unlikely given both the
state of donor coordination and the scale of the Bank’s funding.
The World Bank Group is the single largest source of official development assistance (ODA), providing over $37 B in 2019 (20% more
than the United States, the next largest provider, and 4 times as
much as all regional development banks combined, 7 times as
much as all United Nations agencies combined, and 10 times as
much as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the largest private
donor) (Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development,
2021). Thus, the WB is often playing a leading role in shaping many
aspects of aid strategies and activities, including the subnational
targeting of these activities.
Moreover, while there have been repeated public commitments
to better coordination among donors (including by the WB), there
is still very little evidence of improved coordination. These coordination challenges are well documented both at the country level
(Chandy & Laurence, 2011; Gore, 2013), but a growing body of evidence is also pointing to the lack of coordination at the subnational
level (Öhler, 2013; Findley, Marineau, Powell, & Weaver, 2015;
Nunnenkamp, Rank, & Thiele, 2016). Our case study analysis of
donor coordination in Nigeria (discussed in Section 9) highlights
this phenomenon in one of our sample countries. There is thus little reason to believe that the WB would be acting efficiently by not
concentrating resources in the districts with greatest need because
it correctly anticipates that other donors and domestic governments will do so in response to its own allocations.
Our approach also relies on a static rather than dynamic objective function. There are multiple channels through which longer
term outcomes may flow through to current aid allocations by
donors, including donors considering the persistence of poverty
in some regions due to their slower growth rates (Wood, 2008).
At the subnational region scale, high poverty rates often coincide
with the slowest growth rates. This suggests that incorporating
dynamic objectives into our model would likely sharpen the
response to budget cuts even more in favor of regions with worse
poverty, as donors’ allocations would consider not only their currently high poverty but also their slow declines.

That is, even in the case where marginal costs are equal
across regions, the share of resources being devoted to regions
with worse conditions should increase as a donor’s overall budget in a country shrinks. Importantly, we have only assumed
that public services and conditions are additively separable
substitutes.
We thus reach a second testable prediction:(H2 ) The ratio of aid
funding provided to regions with worse conditions relative to
those with better conditions should grow (or shrink) when total
aid for the country shrinks (or grows), even if marginal costs are
equal across regions
These predictions comport with statements by the World Bank
illustrating its logic in shifting funding priorities as countries transition out of IDA eligibility. For example, during Kenya’s transition
out of IDA eligibility in 2014, the Bank made clear in its Country
Partnership Strategy that ‘‘[a]nother key to help target support
for the poor is to focus on agriculture, a high priority since it has
such a direct link with helping families in rural areas where a
majority of Kenyans live” (World Bank, 2014a, vi). As such, this
new Country Partnership Strategy for Kenya reflects an intention
to efficiently allocate resources under a situation of changing lending eligibility conditions. Importantly, since a key part of the World
Bank’s approach involves consulting with recipient countries in
formulating Country Assistance Strategies, there is evidence that
recipient governments take into consideration shifting budgets in
designing poverty reduction strategies. For example, the 2003
Country Assistance Strategy for Macedonia noted that the government decide to ‘‘reduce the scope of work” in its Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper once Macedonia became ineligible for IDA assistance (World Bank, 2003, 5, footNote 5). The development goals
articulated in what become the Country Assistance Strategy
emphasized both ‘‘the efficient management of public resources”
and the need to ‘‘protect the most vulnerable” (World Bank,
2003, 20).

3.2. Alternative assumptions
Our conceptual framework makes a number of important
assumptions that lead to our predictions. Firstly, we assume
b > 0, making conditions and aid allocations substitutes (rather
than complements). One reason this could fail to hold would be
if aid impacts are correlated negatively with need and are actually negative in higher-need areas. However, there is actually little evidence that project impacts are in fact worse in higher need
areas. At the cross-country scale, Denizer, Kaufmann, and Kraay
(2013) document that country governance and economic growth
dynamics explain very little of the variation in World Bank project outcomes. Project results do vary substantially within countries, as Denizer et al. (2013) show, but not primarily on the basis
of regional characteristics. At the same time, a spate of subnational studies in the health sector suggest that health interventions may actually be more effective in higher need areas.
Whittington, Jeuland, Barker, and Yuen (2012) and BenjaminChung and Colford (2016) both conduct meta-analyses of common health interventions and find that their cost effectiveness
depend critically on herd protection dynamics, meaning that
impacts are greater in higher need areas compared to lower need
areas with more existing coverage. Even absent herd protection, a
variety of health interventions appear to have disproportionate
impacts on people with worse initial conditions. For example,
Thomas et al. (2003) show that iron supplementation and
deworming has particularly large impacts on those whose baseline hemoglobin levels were particularly low.
The only paper showing greater impacts in lower need locations
comes from Europe, where Becker et al. (2013) study the impacts

4
One possible direction for future research would be to extend the model to
incorporate the possibility of the Samaritan’s Dilemma, with donors’ response to need
creating perverse incentives for recipient governments to exert less effort (a la Hagen
(2006)). Such an adaptation would have to account for the empirical facts discussed in
Section 2 of greater aid funding flowing to subnational areas with better conditions
rather than worse, undercutting recipients’ expectations that donors will respond to
worsening needs.

4
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Finally, we define donors’ objective function on the basis of
joint utility derived from conditions and aid allocations. These
comport with the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goal
#1 and the WB’s own ‘‘twin goals” of ending extreme poverty (reducing the percentage of people living on less than $1.25/day to
less than 3%) and promoting shared prosperity (defined in terms
of the living standards of the bottom 40% of the population in every
country) (World Bank, 2014b). Thus, we consider poverty and living conditions as particularly salient for our objective function.
We recognize that many donors focus on other goals, including
human rights, gender equality, environmental conservation, or
indeed many of the other Sustainable Development Goals. Our conceptual framework is general enough to admit many of these, to
the degree they lead to utility differences across regions on the
basis of the conditions in these regions’ and donors’ investments
in them. Naturally, there are other objectives that would require
different modeling approaches.

Table 1
Sample countries.
Albania
Angola
Azerbaijan
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Cameroon
China

Dem. Rep. of the Congo
Djibouti
Georgia
Ghana
Guyana
Honduras
India
Indonesia

Mongolia
Nigeria
Papua New Guinea
Solomon Islands
Sri Lanka
Ukraine
Uzbekistan

sider the number of locations in each district in which aid projects
took place as another outcome, under the logic that more intense
project activities are likely to be spread across more locations within
a given district. These results are shown in Table 14 in the Appendix.
In our baseline specification, we include aid across all sectors
(as the specific choice of sector may well endogenously respond
to a location’s characteristics). In Section 7, we narrow our measures to only the health sector. In the Appendix, we also include
results narrowed to only the infrastructure sector.
As our Conceptual Framework generates predictions on both
the levels and the ratios of aid, we generate measures that reflect
each. ait captures aid to district i in year t. To account for ratios,
we use the natural logs of aid (lnðait þ 1Þ) for our continuous outcomes measures. As we describe below in our Specifications section, using these measures in our linear empirical specification is
akin to estimating effects on the levels and ratios of aid across districts. Table 1.
To test our theoretical predictions, we use exogenous variation
in countries’ overall aid budgets noted and detailed by Galiani
et al., 2017. The World Bank uses a classification system to categorize low income countries (LICs) and lower-middle income countries (LMICs), with the threshold first established in 1987 and
updated annually based on inflation. Between 1995 and 2010,
the period in our study, 23 countries crossed the LMIC threshold.6
Once a country cross the income threshold for several consecutive
years, it is deemed to be creditworthy and is thus on track to ‘‘graduate” from the highly preferential grant funding provided by IDA. In
practice, these funding reductions occur two to three years after a
country crosses the threshold, as IDA operates under three-year ‘‘replenishment periods.” Actual graduation from IDA (complete ineligibility from this funding source) occurs subsequently (its timing is
likely endogenous). Galiani et al. show that following crossing the
LMIC threshold, countries’ IDA funding as a share of GNI drops by
92%. Importantly, many other donors follow suit, with some even
explicitly using the LMIC threshold as a criteria (as in the case of
the African and Asian Development Banks). Overall aid budgets as
a share of GNI thus shrink by 59% following the crossing (Galiani
et al., 2017).
Based on this context, we limit our sample to the 23 countries
that crossed the LMIC threshold between 1995 and 2010 (the period over which we have georeferenced aid data such that we can
track both pre- and post-crossing allocations). For each country,
we identify the year of crossing, as well as the year at which the
subsequent IDA replenishment period begins. We construct a

4. Data and methodology
4.1. Foreign aid data
Data on foreign assistance at the subnational level is now available for a growing number of countries via the AidData project at
William & Mary. The most comprehensive of these datasets covers
the funding provided by the WB two of its arms, the International
Development Association (IDA) and the International Bureau for
Reconstruction & Development (IBRD). We use the AidData IBRDIDA Projects Geocoded Research Release Level 1 v1.4.2 (AidData,
2017), which covers projects approved between 1995 and 2014.
These projects entailed $630 billion in commitments across Africa,
Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe. The AidData geocoding
effort identified 61,243 locations associated with these projects,
with the vast majority of these geolocated to at least the district
the level.
We structure our analysis data at the level of the second
administrative district (typically, the district level). We do so for
several reasons: first, the variation of aid at this scale is particularly relevant given how dramatically living conditions vary
across districts in most countries, and thus how much of the overall responsiveness of aid to conditions is due to district-level allocations. Second, much of the aid data we rely on is only coded to
this scale (i.e., finer geocoordinates are not available). In some
cases, this is because the aid projects themselves are intended
to have district-wide benefits (such as governance support efforts
aimed at the district governments). For robustness, we also repeat
our analysis using the first administrative units (typically regions
or states).
In each year, we identify whether the district has any newly
approved projects, as well as the approximate total committed
value of these projects in constant 2011 USD.5 We focus on aid
commitments rather than disbursements for two reasons: (1) data
commitments are much more consistently available than data on
disbursements from the World Bank project data underlying the AidData dataset; and (2) aid commitments to each district represent the
planned (i.e. targeted) funding, while disbursements may be affected
by implementation conditions themselves, thereby creating spurious
correlations that reflect implementation rather than targeting. While
our first outcome variable (any projects in the district) is binary, the
other measure (total committed funds) is continuous. We normalize
the latter measure by baseline population to derive a per capita measure of aid in each district-year. As a robustness check, we also con-

6
During our study period (based on the availability of geo-referenced aid data),
there are also 12 countries which moved from LMIC to LIC status (although two of
these are Nigeria and Cameroon, both of which are in our sample, and first
transitioned from LIC to LMIC status before fluctuating and then finally transitioning
to LMIC status more stably). A large segment of the other countries are former Soviet
republics (including Belarus, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, and Ukraine), and
funding changes for these countries were heavily colored by revamping of state
enterprises and market reforms. More generally, the overall funding changes in these
LMIC to LIC transitions for countries are much less consistent than those in LIC to
LMIC direction, making it more difficult to draw generalizable inferences about the
response to aid budget changes.

5
The AidData geocoding methodology does not specify the value of funding
provided to each location, but does approximate these values with even splits of the
total committed funding divided by the number of locations identified.
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erated by the Joint Research Centre of the European Union. The
earliest year for which this data is available is 2000; while not
ideal, this data is unlikely to have been affected dramatically by
aid allocations between 1995 and 2000. In robustness checks, we
confirm that dropping this early period does not alter our results.
A district’s remoteness and access to resources can also reflect
long-term drivers of development. We include the district mean
distance to the coast and to a major waterway from the Global
Self-consistent, Hierarchical, High-resolution Geography Database
(GSHHGD), as well as distances to the nearest on-shore petroleum
and diamond deposits from the Peace Research Institute Oslo
(PRIO) and nearest lootable gold deposit from GOLDATA. Mean distances for districts are determined by disaggregating districts into
regular 1x1km grids cells, calculating distances for each cell, and
averaging results for each district as implemented by GeoQuery.
A growing literature documents the impacts of governance and
institutions on long-term development at the subnational scale.
However, standardized measures of these concepts at the subnational scale with coverage across the globe remain quite scarce.
As one indicator, we rely on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program
Georeferenced Event Database (UCDP-GED) to obtain district
means of the number of conflict fatalities occurring between
1990 and 1995.
Finally, we consider childhood mortality data from the Demographic & Health Surveys (DHS) as a particularly important indicator of well-being, albeit one that is only available at a spatially
granular level for a small subset of our countries. For Bolivia,
Cameroon, Ghana, India, Indonesia, and Nigeria, we are able to generate average under-5 childhood mortality during 1990–1995 for
consistent regions over which we can also obtain health aid project
locations. While this is a small number of countries, they include
large, densely populated countries with many regions and $4.2 billion in WB funding committed during our study time-period.
Summary statistics for our aid and need data are displayed in
Table 2.

dummy variable crossedct that indicates whether country c at year t
had crossed the LMIC threshold in the preceding replenishment
period. Because overall country budgets drop substantially within
three years of threshold crossing, we expect within-country
responses to also occur within this timeframe. As a robustness
check, we confirm that longer lags do not appear to generate such
responses.
4.2. Need data
Our study requires data that is available both at high levels of
spatial granularity and in a standardized way for many developing
countries around the world prior to 1995, when our aid panel
begins. In order to identify whether there is any meaningful aid
responsiveness to local conditions in a varied and comprehensive
way, we obtain a wide array of data derived from a diverse mix
of sources. Our primary criteria for inclusion are their availability
across the developing world (all of our sample countries), fine spatial granularity (finer than district scale, at a minimum), and timeseries availability back to the year 2000 (at a minimum). Our goal
is not to test these conditions measures against one another but to
identify whether aid targeting is responsive to any of them. While
the underlying data are available at differing spatial resolutions,
we aggregate each of these measures to the district scale using
the GeoQuery tool publicly available via AidData. (Goodman,
BenYishay, Lv, & Runfola, 2019). GeoQuery overlays district boundary polygons over each of the need datasets and generates means
(and other statistics) over all of the grid cells falling into each polygon (with grid cells only partially falling into the polygon weighted
by the share of their area within the polygon).
Among our primary set of measures, we use the nighttime lights
(NTL) emissions available annually at 1 km grid cells from the
DMSP-OLS program. A burgeoning literature documents that the
NTL are well correlated with economic activity and other measures
of well-being (Dreher & Axel, 2015; Henderson, Squires,
Storeygard, & Weil, 2017; Bruederle & Anna, 2018). We obtain
the mean NTL emissions in 1992 over each district (thus also
avoiding known limitations with the NTL data when applied at
lower scales). Similarly, we use population totals and density from
the CIESIN GPW v3 data, as Briggs (2017) documents the relevance
of population density in aid allocations. Again, we aggregate the
2.5 km resolution data to district means in 1995.
Because NTL and population density measures may be particularly correlated with need in urban or peri-urban areas, we also
include measures that differentially correlate with well-being in
rural areas. Crop productivity and overall vegetation production
thus serve as key measures in these situations. We focus on the
Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) obtained from
the NASA Land Long-Term Data Record for 1995 at approximately
4 km grid cells (similar measures have been used at varying scales
and from other satellite sources by Burke & Lobell (2017)). This
measure captures how ‘‘green” a given grid cell appears, with
greener cells more productively farmed or forested.
The population, NTL, and NDVI measures all reflect underlying
patterns of human land use, i.e., whether a given area is urban,
peri-urban, farmland, or other, naturally occurring uses. To more
directly incorporate these uses, we rely on the European Space
Agency’s Land Cover 2.0.7 product, which uses satellite-based
reflectance measures to categorize grid cells at 300 m resolution
into 11 categories, including urban, various cropland types (irrigated, rainfed, mosaic), various shrubland, water, etc. We generate
measures of the shares of each district that is classified as urban
and any type of cropland, thereby indicating the extent of urban
or agricultural use.
We further measure the extent of road networks and remoteness of districts using the average travel time to major cities gen-

4.3. Specification
Our first theoretical prediction (H1 ) states that the difference in
the levels of aid funding provided to regions with differing conditions should change in response to changes in total aid flows a
given country. When implementing this empirically using many
regions, we assess how the levels of aid in each region vary with
their conditions heterogeneously with respect to shocks in total
aid flows. That is, we estimate the following specification:

aict ¼ b0 þ b1 Crossedct þ b2 Conditionsic þ b3 Crossedct
 Conditionsic þ Dc þ Dt þ ict
where Conditionsic are the need measures described in our Data section and Dc are country fixed effects absorbing all time-invariant
characteristics common to all districts in each country and Dt are
year fixed effects absorbing the effects of all common temporal
shocks. In some cases, higher values of Conditionsic reflect better
conditions (i.e. NTL) while in others, they reflect worse (i.e. conflict)
or non-ranked outcomes (i.e. NDVI). We estimate this specification
using ordinary least squares and use two-way clustering of standard errors by country and by year following Cameron, Gelbach,
and Miller (2011). Multi-way clustering extends the insights offered
by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) to simultaneously
cover clustering along multiple dimensions (separately), thereby
typically providing more conservative variance estimates (i.e., those
that are less likely to reject the null hypothesis). For our binary outcome measures, this specification takes the form of a linear probability model.
6
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Table 2
Summary Statistics.

New aid projects in district (0/1)
New aid commitments per capita (000’s USD)
Aid locations per capita (count per person)
2

Area of district (km )
Total population (millions of people)
2

Population density (people per km )
Nighttime lights (index value)
NDVI (index value)
Urban share (%)
Cropland share (%)
Road dist. to cities (minutes of travel time)
Dist. to coast (meters)
Dist. to waterway (meters)
Dist. to petroleum (meters)
Dist. to gold (meters)
Dist. to diamonds (meters)
Conflict fatalities (annual fatalities in district)

Obs

Mean

SD

Min

Max

105140
105040
104960
105140

0.074
7318.9
5.95
0.44

0.26
253709.0
314.0
1.65

0
0
0
0.00000100

1
46681392
53099.1
49.6

105060
105080

0.50
340.7

1.22
1184.9

0
0.24

29.5
42914.8

105140
105140
105120
105120
104960
105140
105140
105140
105140
105140
103620

4.76
4601.4
0.027
0.48
336.8
417.9
43.6
270.2
333.1
626.8
0.012

9.87
1304.5
0.11
0.34
447.6
507.4
44.6
331.9
228.3
532.7
0.20

0
675.0
0
0
3.14
0
0
0
3.40
4.41
0

63
7631.1
1
1
9467.8
2665.7
457.9
2277.8
1619.5
2336.2
10.0

Our coefficient of interest is b3 , reflecting the change in allocations to higher-need districts after a country crosses over the LMIC
threshold. The linear model with interactions between region conditions and country-level shocks in aid is equivalent to testing how
the differences in aid between region pairs vary in response to the
differences in their conditions and the total country aid budget.
This difference-in-differences specification thus combines crosssectional variation in need and temporal variation based on country threshold crossing. Again, Galiani et al. (2017) show how the
threshold crossing generates sharp drops in aid, even after controlling for smoother trends in a country’s aid and economic trajectories. Thus, the temporal shock at the country-level can be
considered exogenous from the perspective of regions within that
country, while our use of baseline conditions makes their interaction with the threshold crossing unconfounded with other timeinvariant features. Our coefficient of interest essentially identifies
the within-country heterogeneity in the response to the temporal
shock across districts’ varying need conditions. The large overall
country-level drop in aid relative to GNI of 59% identified by
Galiani et al. (2017) coupled with dramatic variation in need across
districts within each country together provide substantial scope for
us to observe the district-level heterogeneity in aid responses.
We similarly test our second hypothesis (H2 ) via the same specification, but instead use lnðait þ 1Þ as our outcome measure.
Because the differences in these logs of aid across regions are equal
to the ratios of the aid, this specification is equivalent to testing
whether the ratios of aid flows to region pairs change with respect
to the total country-level budget. We can conduct this test for our
continuous measure (total committed funds).
Because we consider multiple outcome variables and 14 different conditions variables, addressing multiple comparisons issues is
crucial. We do so in several ways. First, we use principal components analysis to generate three orthogonal summary measures
of conditions. Factor loadings are shown in Table 3. The first component essentially reflects urbanization, most heavily weighting
nighttime lights, population density, urban share, and road distance travel to urban centers. The second and third factors reflect

Table 3
Principal Components.

Area of district
Total population
Population density
Nighttime lights
NDVI
Urban share
Cropland share
Road dist. to cities
Dist. to coast
Dist. to waterway
Dist. to petroleum
Dist. to gold
Dist. to diamonds
Conflict fatalities

Comp 1

Comp 2

Comp 3

.1742082
.1042281
.4414385
.50863
.0185262
.478758
.1913811
.3263772
.221136
.2022248
.1603379
.0483062
.1027704
.0641467

.30714
.1023339
.2118376
.2051469
.5414113
.2338979
.115942
.2148625
.5007026
.3269403
.034189
.1890697
.0789778
.0065333

.0661096
.3059528
.2158132
.1490906
.2754869
.282047
.5953942
.3643931
.0996497
.0424721
.1463227
.2446885
.3111252
.026141

a broader set of conditions from the remaining variables.7 We
use these components to test whether the results on individual variables are statistically similar to those derived from these summary
measures. Additionally, we consider whether the results for individual variables are both logically and statistically consistent across our
multiple outcome measures. Taken together, these approaches allow
us to guard against over-rejection of our hypotheses based on a
small number of potentially randomly occurring correlations in the
data.
5. Results
We begin by examining the changes in whether any IDA or IBRD
project is located in a given district. In Table 4, we show coefficients on each condition variable, with these variables labeled in
column headings.8 We observe that, before crossing the LMIC
threshold, projects are more likely to be located in districts with larger, more dense populations. Not surprisingly, these districts also
emit more NTL, have higher shares of areas classified as urban, have
shorter average travel times to urban centers, and are closer to
coasts. This set of correlations is consistent with those identified in
Briggs (2017). We do not detect statistical correlations with our
other conditions variables, including greenness and conflict fatalities. Our principal components exhibit a similar pattern: component

7
The loadings on the second and third principal components do not lend
themselves to intuitive interpretation. This is not uncommon in PCA analysis,
particularly since the first component is derived to maximize its variance and
subsequent components must be orthogonal to it, thus exhibiting less variance and
requiring greater nuance in interpretation. In our case, the second component most
heavily weights NDVI (negatively) and distance to the coast (positively), suggesting it
reflects interior districts with less dense vegetation patterns. The third component
most heavily weights cropland share (negatively), indicating it may reflect less arable
conditions.

8
We include the conditions variables one-by-one in the model rather than jointly
because multicollinearity would likely compromise our ability to detect any effects.
The fact that we find few significant interaction effects in our main results means the
interaction effects in a joint model would almost certainly be insignificant.
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Table 4
Any new projects in district.
Panel A
Conditions variable:
Crossed
threshold
Conditions
Crossed
threshold = 1 
Conditions
Observations

(1)
Area of district

(2)
Total
population

(3)
Population
density

(4)
Nighttime lights

(5)
NDVI

(6)
Urban share

(7)
Cropland share

0.00954
(0.0284)
0.00477
(0.00234)
0.00265
(0.00330)

0.00428
(0.0292)
0.0337***
(0.00863)
0.00757
(0.00391)

0.00674
(0.0283)
0.0000107***
(0.00000212)
0.00000455
(0.00000504)

0.00514
(0.0284)
0.00162**
(0.000426)
0.000654
(0.000588)

0.0325
(0.0344)
0.00000670
(0.00000433)
0.00000519
(0.00000542)

0.00675
(0.0282)
0.130**
(0.0369)
0.0513
(0.0626)

0.00590
(0.0291)
0.0228
(0.0218)
0.00514
(0.0113)

105140

105060

105080

105140

105140

105120

105120

(1)
Road dist. to
cities

(2)
Dist. to coast

(3)
Dist. to
waterway

(4)
Dist. to
petroleum

(5)
Dist. to gold

(6)
Dist. to
diamonds

(7)
Conflict
fatalities

(8)
Princ.
Comp.

0.00752
(0.0275)
0.0000251**
(0.00000686)
0.00000190
(0.00000396)

0.00993
(0.0292)
0.0000222*
(0.00000989)
0.00000433
(0.0000163)

0.00797
(0.0271)
0.0000660
(0.0000632)
0.00000593
(0.000106)

0.00588
(0.0282)
0.0000191
(0.0000275)
0.00000871
(0.0000140)

0.00245
(0.0289)
0.0000189
(0.0000237)
0.0000169
(0.0000144)

0.00850
(0.0308)
0.0000267
(0.0000138)
0.000000415
(0.00000418)

0.00805
(0.0291)
0.000677
(0.00394)
0.0188***
(0.00382)

0.00794
(0.0289)

Panel B
Conditions variable:
Crossed
threshold
Conditions
Crossed
threshold = 1 
Conditions
PC 1

0.0143***
(0.00242)
0.00720
(0.00491)
0.0135
(0.00646)
0.00420
(0.00376)
0.00252
(0.00425)
0.000104
(0.00371)

PC 2
PC 3
Crossed
X PC1
Crossed
X PC2
Crossed
X PC3
Observations

104960

105140

105140

105140

105140

105140

103620

103500

Standard error clustered by country and year in parentheses. *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1.

nighttime lights (SD = 9.87) generally experience 1.6 percentage
points higher probabilities of having any new aid projects (a
21.6% increase over the mean probability of 7.4%). After crossing
the threshold, this drops by 0.6 percentage points to a 1.0 percentage points higher probability (interaction coefficient of
0:000654 SD of 9:87 ¼ 0:00645 drop). In other words, the
interaction effect is only equivalent to approximately 40% of the
cross-sectional correlation between need and aid, and thus not
large enough to undo the strong correlation of aid locations with
better need conditions.
The first principal component, which effectively combines a
number of these variables, also exhibits a significant increase in
project funding after threshold crossing. This indicates that while
more urban settings may not be any more likely to see projects
after threshold crossing, the funding they receive does appear to
increase.
Importantly, we also observe large and significant increases in
funding commitments for districts with higher conflict fatalities,
consistent with our findings on whether any projects are sited in
these districts. This is also consistent with our results on the number of project locations per district (See Table 14 in the Appendix).
Taken together, the results on project siting and funding amounts
indicate that the World Bank significantly increased levels of aid to
conflict-affected locations after a country crossed the LMIC threshold (thereby confirming H1 for conflict conditions).
We also test our second hypothesis by using the natural log of
committed funds as our outcome measure in the same specification. This allows us to test for efficient responses to tightening bud-

1, which places substantial weight on population, NTL, and urban
status, shows a strong correlation with whether a project is sited
in a district, while the other components do not.
The threshold crossing appears to counteract these correlations
slightly, but in general the coefficients on the interaction terms for
nearly all variables are not statistically distinguishable from zero.
The only meaningful statistical effect appears to be on the correlation with conflict fatalities. Crossing the LMIC threshold substantially increases the probability that an aid project will be located
in a district that experienced higher conflict fatalities at baseline.
This represents a significant extension of World Bank funding to
districts that had experienced conflict. To be clear, we use our measures of conflict fatalities during the early 1990’s as a baseline
measure to avoid endogeneity concerns; in some instances, these
districts may still be experiencing conflict after the threshold
crossing, while in other cases, these may be post-conflict settings.
While we observe strong correlations between our conditions
and whether a district sees projects sited in its borders, we do
not find such correlations with the funding amounts for these projects (Table 5). In fact, the only cross-sectional correlation appears
to be with NDVI, as districts with higher mean greenness measures
see smaller committed funds per capita. However, after crossing
the LMIC threshold, funding amounts significantly increase for districts that have higher urban shares. There is a large but not significant increase in districts with higher NTL and those that are more
densely populated as well, although these effects are too small and
noisy to detect (Table 4). For example, the magnitudes of the coefficients imply that districts with one standard deviation more
8
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Table 5
New funding per capita in district (US$ 000’s)
Panel A
Conditions variable:
Crossed
threshold
Conditions
Crossed
threshold = 1 
Conditions
Observations

(1)
Area of district

(2)
Total
population

(3)
Population
density

(4)
Nighttime lights

(5)
NDVI

(6)
Urban share

(7)
Cropland share

76.63
(549.7)
805.2
(914.0)
588.2
(762.8)

110.5
(518.8)
611.9
(556.3)
200.4
(896.1)

304.3***
(0.00127)
0.0668
(0.246)
1.613
(1.665)

2741.7
(1404.8)
274.5
(255.0)
625.7
(449.0)

9671.3
(13963.9)
4.053
(2.103)
2.115
(2.941)

1339.8
(1265.4)
23373.5
(15285.4)
54232.2*
(24280.2)

4774.1
(3638.1)
4515.0
(4075.8)
11047.7
(7437.8)

105040

105040

105040

105040

105040

105040

105040

(1)
Road dist. to
cities

(2)
Dist. to coast

(3)
Dist. to
waterway

(4)
Dist. to
petroleum

(5)
Dist. to
gold

(6)
Dist. to
diamonds

(7)
Conflict
fatalities

(8)
Princ.
Comp.

2379.3**
(645.6)
2.067
(12.15)
6.191
(13.53)

3288.4
(2192.0)
0.874
(3.272)
7.813
(8.165)

3653.2
(2153.8)
16.63
(54.08)
80.46
(78.88)

2099.4
(1849.9)
14.90
(10.41)
7.043
(12.22)

2458.7
(2360.4)
1.286
(2.284)
7.808
(7.836)

614.9
(1793.9)
0.137
(3.137)
1.238
(4.574)

361.3
(426.4)
1037.8
(1511.6)
44324.8***
(900.8)

215.8
(406.7)

Panel B
Conditions variable:
Crossed
threshold
Conditions
Crossed
threshold = 1 
Conditions
PC 1

790.7
(1437.4)
2144.1
(1193.3)
234.3
(1057.7)
4090.9*
(1950.6)
810.5
(2322.3)
503.8
(1031.8)

PC 2
PC 3
Crossed
X PC1
Crossed
X PC2
Crossed
X PC3
Observations

104900

105040

105040

105040

105040

105040

103580

103500

Standard error clustered by country and year in parentheses. *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1.

only changes after LMIC threshold crossing based on the conflict
fatalities conditions across districts.
It is also possible that the threshold crossing is temporally correlated with longer-term changes in countries’ aid flows and
socioeconomic developments. Because our baseline specification
includes only country fixed effects and common time fixed effects,
it does not adjust for such longer-term changes in aid specific to a
given country. If these longer-term changes are in fact correlated
with the timing of the LMIC threshold crossing, this could be a
challenge to our causal identification. To account for this, we thus
add country-specific time trends as controls to our baseline specification, thereby accounting for smooth changes over the 20-year
sample window that are specific to individual countries (beyond
the sample-wide changes occurring in a given year that are
accounted for by our year fixed effects). This is akin to estimating
only the discontinuous changes in aid allocation following threshold crossing, a la Galiani et al. (2017). In Table 8, we show effects
on project siting in a district with this specification. We again find
significant interaction effects between threshold crossing and conflict fatalities. No other interaction terms exhibit effects significant
at the 5% level.
As described in the Data section, we test for changes in aid allocations in the replenishment period following the LMIC threshold
crossing. It is possible that these changes take time to materialize,
so we may not observe such effects after longer lags. In Table 9, we
use a three year lag in our crossed variable (reflecting changes in
the next three-year replenishment period), as well as its interaction with our conditions variables. We continue to find evidence
of shifts in project siting toward conflict-affected districts.

gets after LMIC threshold crossing even in the case in which the
marginal costs of delivering aid to districts are the same. In Table 6,
we find largely similar patterns to those when considering outcomes in levels. More funds are initially provided to projects
located in districts with greater population counts, population densities, NTL, and urban shares. Thus, we see large and significant
correlations of aid funding with the first principal component.
However, we do not see significant changes after the threshold
crossing along most of these conditions and the first component.
At the same time, we do see a large and significant increase in
the log of committed funds provided to districts with higher conflict fatalities. Again, we can reject the null hypothesis for H2 for
this conflict dimension, but not for our other measures. It appears
that in terms of both the levels and ratios of aid provided, World
Bank funding disproportionately flows to conflict-affected areas
in response to tightening budgets.
6. Robustness checks
We consider the robustness of our estimates to the inclusion of
additional controls for district-specific unobservables, differential
time trends for each country, longer lags between threshold crossing and aid changes, and different specifications for both our estimation and our conditions variables.
In Table 7, we add district fixed effects to our baseline specification for project siting in a district, accounting for time-invariant
district unobservables (beyond the country-wide unobservables
accounted for by the country fixed effects in our baseline models).
The interaction terms remain largely unaffected, as project siting
9
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Table 6
Ln(funding) in district (US$ 000’s).
Panel A
Conditions variable:
Crossed
threshold
Conditions
Crossed
threshold = 1 
Conditions
Observations

(1)
Area of district

(2)
Total
population

(3)
Population
density

(4)
Nighttime lights

(5)
NDVI

(6)
Urban share

(7)
Cropland share

0.0841
(0.243)
0.0375
(0.0231)
0.0173
(0.0291)

0.0350
(0.251)
0.252***
(0.0568)
0.0783**
(0.0254)

0.0646
(0.243)
0.0000906***
(0.0000189)
0.0000340
(0.0000403)

0.0572
(0.242)
0.0147***
(0.00341)
0.00389
(0.00505)

0.336
(0.322)
0.0000691
(0.0000389)
0.0000557
(0.0000552)

0.0673
(0.241)
1.202**
(0.314)
0.289
(0.552)

0.0582
(0.258)
0.104
(0.179)
0.0384
(0.112)

105040

105040

105040

105040

105040

105040

105040

(1)
Road dist. to
cities

(2)
Dist. to coast

(3)
Dist. to
waterway

(4)
Dist. to
petroleum

(5)
Dist. to gold

(6)
Dist. to
diamonds

(7)
Conflict
fatalities

(8)
Princ.
Comp.

0.0566
(0.232)
0.000183**
(0.0000560)
0.0000539
(0.0000517)

0.0765
(0.249)
0.000176
(0.0000948)
0.00000259
(0.000159)

0.0665
(0.233)
0.000685
(0.000643)
0.000212
(0.00109)

0.0595
(0.243)
0.000202
(0.000252)
0.0000600
(0.000137)

0.0306
(0.242)
0.000203
(0.000203)
0.000131
(0.000155)

0.0795
(0.265)
0.000188
(0.000122)
0.00000598
(0.0000521)

0.0762
(0.250)
0.000147
(0.0464)
0.259***
(0.0491)

0.0754
(0.246)

Panel B
Conditions variable:
Crossed
threshold
Conditions
Crossed
threshold = 1 
Conditions
PC 1

0.116***
(0.0192)
0.0623
(0.0445)
0.0882
(0.0533)
0.0233
(0.0326)
0.0327
(0.0425)
0.0114
(0.0342)

PC 2
PC 3
Crossed
X PC1
Crossed
X PC2
Crossed
X PC3
Observations

104900

105040

105040

105040

105040

105040

103580

103500

Standard error clustered by country and year in parentheses. *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1.

Table 7
Any new projects in district, adding district fixed effects.
Panel A
(1)
Area of district

(2)
Total
population

(3)
Population
density

(4)
Nighttime lights

(5)
NDVI

(6)
Urban share

(7)
Cropland share

Crossed
threshold
Crossed
threshold = 1 
Conditions

0.00979
(0.0286)
0.00316
(0.00348)

0.00678
(0.0291)
0.00274
(0.00385)

0.00666
(0.0283)
0.00000481
(0.00000524)

0.00621
(0.0283)
0.000426
(0.000522)

0.0185
(0.0376)
0.00000220
(0.00000556)

0.00767
(0.0282)
0.0192
(0.0614)

0.00325
(0.0285)
0.0110
(0.00924)

Observations

105140

105060

105080

105140

105140

105120

105120

(1)
Road dist. to
cities

(2)
Dist. to coast

(3)
Dist. to
waterway

(4)
Dist. to
petroleum

(5)
Dist. to gold

(6)
Dist. to
diamonds

(7)
Conflict
fatalities

(8)
Princ.
Comp.

Crossed
threshold
Crossed
threshold = 1 
Conditions
Crossed
X PC1
Crossed
X PC2
Crossed
X PC3

0.00655
(0.0273)
0.00000465
(0.00000364)

0.00976
(0.0287)
0.00000390
(0.0000165)

0.00840
(0.0271)
0.00000406
(0.000113)

0.00726
(0.0281)
0.00000358
(0.0000146)

0.00660
(0.0291)
0.00000474
(0.0000225)

0.00874
(0.0305)
0.000000763
(0.00000370)

0.00811
(0.0291)
0.0236***
(0.00491)

0.00795
(0.0290)

Observations

104960

Conditions variable:

Panel B
Conditions variable:

0.00259
(0.00384)
0.00106
(0.00400)
0.00107
(0.00445)
105140

105140

105140

Standard error clustered by country and year in parentheses. *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1.
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Table 8
Any new project in district, adding country-specific trends.
Panel A
Conditions variable:
Crossed
threshold
Conditions
Crossed
threshold = 1 
Conditions
Observations

(1)
Area of district

(2)
Total
population

(3)
Population
density

(4)
Nighttime lights

(5)
NDVI

(6)
Urban share

(7)
Cropland share

0.000268
(0.0273)
0.00408**
(0.00141)
0.00153
(0.00101)

0.00658
(0.0285)
0.0349**
(0.00996)
0.0100
(0.00672)

0.00203
(0.0273)
0.0000103***
(0.00000190)
0.00000305
(0.00000361)

0.00349
(0.0277)
0.00159***
(0.000408)
0.000562
(0.000561)

0.0419*
(0.0176)
0.00000843
(0.00000450)
0.00000930*
(0.00000421)

0.00196
(0.0273)
0.125**
(0.0349)
0.0388
(0.0544)

0.00762
(0.0265)
0.0261
(0.0224)
0.0143
(0.0174)

105140

105060

105080

105140

105140

105120

105120

(1)
Road dist. to
cities

(2)
Dist. to coast

(3)
Dist. to
waterway

(4)
Dist. to
petroleum

(5)
Dist. to gold

(6)
Dist. to
diamonds

(7)
Conflict
fatalities

(8)
Princ.
Comp.

0.00370
(0.0273)
0.0000328***
(0.00000771)
0.0000138*
(0.00000568)

0.00192
(0.0311)
0.0000197*
(0.00000756)
0.00000216
(0.0000109)

0.00277
(0.0262)
0.0000531
(0.0000419)
0.0000410
(0.0000558)

0.0175
(0.0285)
0.0000356
(0.0000301)
0.0000545*
(0.0000253)

0.0104
(0.0326)
0.0000240
(0.0000234)
0.0000290
(0.0000176)

0.0213
(0.0359)
0.0000411*
(0.0000172)
0.0000345
(0.0000168)

0.00183
(0.0280)
0.00311
(0.00381)
0.0111***
(0.00204)

0.00134
(0.0274)

Panel B
Conditions variable:
Crossed
threshold
Conditions
Crossed
threshold = 1 
Conditions
PC 1

0.0145***
(0.00232)
0.00815
(0.00462)
0.0161*
(0.00644)
0.00444
(0.00239)
0.00540
(0.00356)
0.00697*
(0.00322)

PC 2
PC 3
Crossed
X PC1
Crossed
X PC2
Crossed
X PC3
Observations

104960

105140

105140

105140

105140

105140

103620

103500

Standard error clustered by country and year in parentheses. *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1.

Finally, we consider whether these changes are driven by nonlinearities and outliers among the small number of conflictaffected districts in our data. Recall that our measures are based
on the mean conflict fatalities between 1990 and 1995 recorded
in the UCDP dataset. In this data, only 9% of districts see any fatalities in this time period. We thus explore whether the effects on aid
allocations are due to increasing funding to this subsample or to
changes in allocations within this subsample. We find evidence
of adjustments on both of these margins. In Table 10, we first show
effects on project siting and committed funds per capita with our
conditions variable now formulated as a dummy indicating any
conflict fatalities in 1990–95. We continue to see differential
changes on both outcomes toward districts with any conflict. We
then limit our sample to only these conflict-affected districts and
use the continuous measure of mean fatalities on the right hand
side. We find that even among this sample, there are significant
changes in aid siting and funding based on conflict conditions, with
worse off districts seeing aid projects more frequently and with
greater funding. Finally, we confirm that these effects are not due
to leverage exerted on linear estimation due to the presence of disproportionately high conflict districts. We use the natural log of
conflict fatalities as our measure of conditions in the full sample,
again finding a similar pattern of effects. Taken together, these
tests confirm that tightening aid budgets cause World Bank aid
projects to be increasingly devoted to conflict-affected zones.

7. Health sector
Donor targeting in the health sector is of particular importance
because a large array of interventions have been shown to cost
effectively reduce disease burdens and mortality rates, but existing
evidence suggests highly imperfect targeting of these interventions
to the populations with highest needs (Kotsadam et al., 2018). This
is particularly concerning both because of the scale of the
resources devoted to health sector aid (the WB alone committed
more than $100 B to the sector during our study period) and
because, as we describe in our Conceptual Framework, much of
the literature on health aid suggests impacts may be greater in
higher-need locations.
We therefore focus our analysis on the subsample of health aid
projects, assessing their allocation relative to standardized measures of population health. There are many such potential measures, but few of these are consistently available for our pre1995 period in which our geocoded IDA-IBRD project sample
begins. We thus limit our sample to Bolivia, Cameroon, Ghana,
India, Indonesia, and Nigeria. Helpfully, several of these are large,
diverse countries, providing substantial variation in health conditions prior to their crossing the LMIC threshold.
We utilize the DHS surveys to construct baseline measures of
population health, focusing on child mortality and morbidity rates,
as these are known to be particularly sensitive to health
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Table 9
Any new project in district, crossover lagged three years.
Panel A
Conditions
variable:
Crossed
threshold (t-3)
Conditions
Crossed
(t-3) X
Conditions
Observations

(1)
Area of district

(2)
Total
population

(3)
Population
density

(4)
Nighttime
lights

(5)
NDVI

(6)
Urban share

(7)
Cropland
share

0.0206
(0.0295)
0.00124
(0.00117)
0.00318
(0.00162)

0.0203
(0.0293)
0.0315*
(0.0125)
0.00385
(0.00911)

0.0215
(0.0276)
0.00000890***
(0.00000205)
0.00000268
(0.00000817)

0.0206
(0.0282)
0.00138**
(0.000374)
0.000363
(0.000558)

0.0124
(0.0296)
0.00000322
(0.00000614)
0.00000209
(0.00000946)

0.0219
(0.0282)
0.104**
(0.0304)
0.0140
(0.0638)

0.0182
(0.0303)
0.0258
(0.0284)
0.00968
(0.0322)

89369

89301

89318

89369

89369

89352

89352

(1)
Road dist. to
cities

(2)
Dist. to coast

(3)
Dist. to
waterway

(4)
Dist. to
petroleum

(5)
Dist. to gold

(6)
Dist. to
diamonds

(7)
Conflict
fatalities

(8)
Princ.
Comp.

0.00286
(0.0285)
0.0000177
(0.0000108)
0.0000183
(0.0000194)

0.00375
(0.0284)
0.0000248***
(0.00000334)
0.00000707
(0.00000982)

0.00302
(0.0282)
0.0000542
(0.0000425)
0.0000470
(0.000131)

0.00343
(0.0287)
0.0000197
(0.0000250)
0.00000823
(0.0000228)

0.00174
(0.0271)
0.0000263
(0.0000252)
0.0000398
(0.0000353)

0.00210
(0.0277)
0.0000137
(0.0000170)
0.0000295*
(0.0000138)

0.00313
(0.0297)
0.000596
(0.00673)
0.0258*
(0.00975)

0.00347
(0.0294)

Panel B
Conditions
variable:
Crossed
threshold
Conditions
Crossed
(t-3) X
Conditions
PC 1

0.0128***
(0.00299)
0.00463
(0.00621)
0.0120
(0.00938)
0.00235
(0.00413)
0.00369
(0.00769)
0.00622
(0.0111)

PC 2
PC 3
Crossed
(t-3) X PC1
Crossed
(t-3) X PC2
Crossed
(t-3) X PC3
Observations

89216

89369

89369

89369

89369

89369

88077

87975

Standard error clustered by country and year in parentheses. *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1.

conditions. We calculate child mortality rates from the DHS birth

histories for the pre-1995 DHS surveys available. DHS sample sizes

Table 10
Conflict.

(1)
Conflict as
dummy
Crossed threshold
1(Conflict
fatalities)
Crossed
threshold = 1
 1(Conflict
fatalities)
Conflict fatalities

0.0116
(0.0302)
0.00391
(0.00925)
0.0427

(3)
Ln
(conflict)

(4)
New aid commitments
per capita (000’s)

0.0384
(0.0270)

0.0829
(0.0454)

1567.1
(809.7)
630.8
(1959.4)
19867.6*

(0.0256)

Crossed
threshold = 1
 Conflict
fatalities
Ln(conflict
fatalities)
Crossed
threshold = 1
 Ln(conflict
fatalities)
Observations

Any projects in district
(2)
Continuous measure in
conflict-affected sample

103620

Committed funds in district
(5)
(6)
New aid commitments
New aid commitments
per capita (000’s)
per capita (000’s)
15251.2
(10435.1)

79283.2***
(475.3)

(8302.7)
0.00691**
(0.00202)
0.0111*

701.9
(1166.0)
40611.0***

(0.00474)

(4771.8)

9780

0.00138
(0.00431)
0.0201

1411.2
(1635.7)
17506.8***

(0.0110)

(1187.4)

103620

103580

Standard error clustered by country and year in parentheses. *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1.
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findings do not support either of the hypotheses from our conceptual framework, indicating that WB health aid does not efficiently
respond to budget shocks through geographic reallocation.

make the estimates representative at the first administrative unit
(typically region or state) rather than district level. Our unit of
analysis is thus the region-year. Because these regions vary substantially in population and size, we weight our analysis by
population.
We narrow our sectoral coverage to only projects with a healthrelated theme identified in the WB database. The IDA-IBRD database contains 272 health projects in the six countries that were
approved between 1995 and 2014, entailing $4,193,205,237 in
committed funds.
In Table 11, we estimate effects on project siting and funding
outcomes at the region level. We begin by estimating our baseline
specification including country and year fixed effects to account for
time-invariant unobservables at the country level and samplewide annual movements in aid siting. In column 2, we add
country-specific trends that account for smooth changes taking
place in each country over the 1995–2014 sample period. In column 3, we further add region-specific fixed effects that adjust for
time-invariant unobservables at this subnational scale, and column
4 adds country-year fixed effects. Throughout, we do not find a significant interaction between the initial mortality rate in each
region and the threshold crossing.
It is possible that our interaction of threshold crossing with a
linear term in initial child mortality masks responses that are vary
non-linearly across the initial mortality distribution. We explore
this by decomposing initial mortality into five bins (0–49, 50–99,
100–149, 150–199, and P 200 per 1,000 births). We show these
results in columns 5–7. Once we adjust for country-year-specific
unobservables in columns 6 and 7, we find that crossing the
threshold increased the likelihood that regions with the lowest initial mortality receive health aid projects. Regions with higher mortality rates receive aid projects at differentially lower rates after
the threshold crossing. The differential changes decline across
these bins, albeit non-monotonically at the top end of the mortality
distribution.
We statistically test whether the changes post-threshold for
regions in the 50–99 mortality bin and those in the 150–199 bin
are equal. These differential changes are statistically distinguishable when we include year and country fixed effects and smooth
country trends (col 5). After adjusting for country-year-specific
unobservables (col 6), these effects are no longer statistically distinguishable. Column 7 confirms that this finding is not due to
the use of population weights by repeating the specification in Column 6 without weighting the analysis by population.
We find quite similar results when we consider as our outcome
variable the amount of committed funds in the region (cols 8–10).
Again, we find changes post-crossing that do not vary linearly in
the initial child mortality distribution, with coefficients that suggest lower allocations for regions in the 50–199 mortality rate bins
than those with the lowest mortality. However, these differential
changes post-crossing are not statistically distinguishable.
We also consider additional measures of child health beyond
mortality rates. We use the same pre-1995 DHS survey waves to
calculate the prevalence of diarrhea and fever in children under 5
in each region. In Table 12, we estimate the effects on project siting
and committed funding, with region and year fixed effects, as well
as either country-specific trends or country-year fixed effects. The
interaction between threshold crossing and initial health conditions is not significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence
level for any of the specifications or health measures. We estimate
a small, positive coefficient on the interaction between crossover
and diarrhea prevalence in column 2 (significant at the 90% confidence level), but this slight effect does not survive when changing
outcome or health measures.
Taken together, these results confirm that health aid is no better
targeted towards health needs after the threshold crossing. Our

8. Offsetting differences in costs?
As we detail in our conceptual framework, it is possible that differences in marginal costs across locations of varying need may
dampen the response to tightening budgets. In particular, if areas
of high need are also those where aid activities are most expensive
to implement, an efficient response to a shrinking budget may see
only small increases in the share of funding provided in these
areas. Our null results on changes in aid based on districts’ population, economic activity, and geophysical characteristics may thus
reflect efficient responses if costs differ substantially across these
characteristics. Theory is ambiguous about whether such cost differences are likely to occur: while frictions can give rise to price
variations in locally sourced inputs and labor, donors and implementers source many inputs from international or selected domestic suppliers. We therefore explore empirically whether project
costs differ substantially across regions of varying conditions, particularly those along which we do not detect changes in aid allocations after LMIC threshold crossing. We find little evidence of any
such correlation, with or without extensive fixed effects adjusting
for unobservables.
We overcome several key data constraints presented by the WB
data. First, the WB provides only the total costs of each project,
spread over all its locations, inclusive of management and oversight costs. We therefore conduct the analysis at the project level,
averaging the need measures over each project’s locations to create
our explanatory variable of interest. As our dependent variable, we
use the total funds committed by the project, as well as the total
funds divided by number of locations and, separately, total funds
divided by population in all serviced locations.
Our second constraint is that although we would like to know
average rather than total costs, the WB does not consistently provide quantities of inputs used by each project. To overcome this,
we use project evaluation data, particularly the project’s implementation success rating, as a control variable. In doing so, we
assume that projects with greater implementation success likely
used fewer inputs to provide greater outputs (or used similar
quantities of inputs to provide greater outputs, or both). These project implementation ratings are generally provided by the WB Task
Team Leaders and validated or replaced by ratings from the WB
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) in a subset of cases.
To study the empirical relationship with as much statistical
power as possible, we use the full sample of World Bank projects
in the geocoded IDA-IBRD datasbase. We address the potential correlation of project characteristics with unobserved confounds by
adopting country, year, and sector fixed effects. We thus estimate
the following specification:

Costspcst ¼ b0 þ b1 Needpc þ b2 Ov erallRating pcst þ b3 ImpRating pcst
þ Dc þ Dt þ Ds þ pcst
where Costspcst represents the costs for project p in country c
focused on sector s begun in year t; Needpc is the mean of the need
measures across all locations serviced by the project, OverallRating
and ImpRating are the project’s overall and implementation evaluation scores, and Dc ; Dt and Ds are country, year, and sector fixed
effects. We cluster our standard errors by country and year.
Our findings indicate that project costs are not correlated with
population density, NTL, or NDVI in the locations they serve, as
shown in the Table 13 above. This is true irrespective of whether
we use total project costs, project costs per location, or project
costs per capita as our outcome measure. We observe very weak
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Table 11
Health Aid and Child Mortality.

Crossed threshold
Initial Child Mortality X Crossed threshold
Initial Child Mortality

(1)
Baseline

(2)
+ Country
Trends

0.05719
(0.1963)
0.00003066
(0.0009040)
0.0006691
(0.0006282)

0.1788
(0.1722)
-0.001165
(0.0007359)
0.0009411
(0.0006144)

Any projects in region
(3)
(4)
Region FEs
+ CountryYear
FEs
0.1727
(0.1601)
-0.001109
(0.0007099)

14

Crossed threshold = 1  Child mortality bin
minimum = 100
Crossed threshold = 1  Child mortality bin
minimum = 150
Crossed threshold = 1  Child mortality bin
minimum = 200
Y
Y
N
N
N

Y
Y
Y
N
N

–
Y
Y
Y
N

(6)
Mortality
Bins

Committed funds in district
(7)
(8)
(9)
Unweighted New
Ln
Commitments
(Commitments)

(10)
Mortality
Bins

0.07006
(0.1287)

0.9399***
(0.06830)

0.1143**
(0.04932)

2.7260*
(1.4939)
6343.8
(31717.6)

-0.0007955
(0.0006624)

Crossed threshold = 1  Child mortality bin
minimum = 50

Country FE
Year FE
Country Trends
Region FE
Country X Year FE
P-value Crossed X Mortality Bin
50 = Crossed X Mortality Bin 150

(5)
Mortality
Bins

–
Y
N
Y
Y

-0.003780
(0.008189)

-0.09952***

0.1031***

-0.08885*

1.4198*

(0.02073)
0.1349***

(0.03346)
0.1378

(0.04662)
0.1069*

(0.7082)
2.5393*

(0.04382)
0.1557***

(0.08784)
0.1632**

(0.05507)
0.1327**

(1.4132)
3.1386***

(0.01485)
0.1103

(0.06290)
0.1499**

(0.05221)
0.1201**

(1.0533)
2.5970

(0.07005)

(0.06821)

(0.05000)

Y
N
Y
Y
0.3543

–
Y
N
Y
Y
0.2185

–
Y
N
Y
N
0.00009424

(1.6060)
Y
Y
N
N
N

Y
Y
N
N
N

Y
Y
N
N
N
0.1126

Standard errors clustered by region and year in parentheses.
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Table 12
Health Aid and Child Morbidity.

(1)
Any Project
in Region
Crossed threshold
Initial Diarrhea Prev. X
Crossed threshold
Initial Fever Prev. X
Crossed threshold
Region FE
Year FE
Country Trends
Country X Year FE

0.06904
(0.1615)
0.01657
(0.02180)

Y
Y
Y
N

Diarrhea Prevalence
(2)
(3)
Any Project
Committed
in Region
funds in region

0.02885*
(0.01391)

Y
Y
–
Y

0.004341
(0.1244)
0.05328
(0.03883)

Y
Y
Y
N

(4)
Committed
funds in region

(5)
Any Project
in Region

Fever
(6)
Any Project
in Region

0.07719
(0.1670)

Prevalence
(7)
Committed
funds in region

(8)
Committed
funds in region

0.004190
(0.1256)

0.1026
(0.06203)
0.01330
(0.01085)

0.01876
(0.01929)

0.02435
(0.01809)

-0.02476

(0.01587)
Y
Y
–
Y

Y
Y
Y
N

Y
Y
–
Y

Y
Y
Y
N

Y
Y
–
Y

Standard errors clustered by region and year in parentheses.

Table 13
Costs analysis.
DV = Total amounts per location
Luminosity

0.0692
(0.126)

0.0998
(0.131)

Population

2.35e-05
(2.20e-05)

2.57e-05
(2.26e-05)

NDVI
Constant
FEs
Project Rating Controls
N
Observations

27.48*
(15.04)
Y
N
34,411
0.150

34.20
(24.65)
Y
Y
33,941
0.162

28.29*
(15.16)
Y
N
34,411
0.150

34.98
(24.64)
Y
Y
33,941
0.162

0.00451
(0.00325)
21.05
(13.93)
Y
N
34,411
0.150

0.00480
(0.00335)
27.53
(22.99)
Y
Y
33,941
0.162

tance Strategies that the World Bank has sought to shift in priorities in the wake of partner country transitions out of IDA eligibility
and changing overall aid budgets, there is also evidence of continuity. For example, the 2006 Country Assistance Strategy in Honduras
emphasized that, ‘‘[i]nstitutionalization and continuity are critical
for achieving development objectives” in advocating for a continuation of past funding priorities (World Bank, 2006, 15). At the same
time, it is also likely that citizens prefer at least proportional allocations (and potentially more progressive ones), but the crosssectional data show allocations that are positively correlated with
wealth. To justify the efficiency of our results, policymakers and
citizens would need to have preferences that are quite uncommon.
It is therefore unlikely that our results show efficient targeting outcomes. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that observed
allocations are in line with an alternative set of preferences. Still,
while the preferences we assume here may not reflect the Bank’s
true preferences, they are a useful baseline for comparison in the
sense that they comport not only with the Bank’s stated goals
but also how the international community and interested observers believe aid ought to be allocated.
Who actually controls decisions over the siting and funding of
aid projects within a country is an important question, one from
which we abstract. Experience suggests that foreign donors,
national governments, and implementing agency staff all play a
role in these decisions, with the locus of control shifting as the geographic units become smaller. For example, donors and national
governments may have strong preferences over allocations across
regions but leave decisions over specific villages within districts
to implementers. It is nonetheless important for actors across this
spectrum to have at their disposal sufficiently rich geographic data
on conditions to support efficiency aims.

positive correlations with population density and NTL that are not
statistically different from zero. Greenness, as measured by NDVI,
is associated with slightly lower project costs, but again the correlation is quite weak and not statistically different from zero. Taken
together, these results confirm that the non-response of WB project sites and funding to tightening budgets does not efficiently
account for differences in need across locations.
9. Conclusions
Our results suggest that, at least among a particularly large and
influential multilateral donor, project siting and funding does not
appear to efficiently respond to tightening budget constraints,
except in the case of conflict-affected districts. One explanation
of our results is that policymakers use a different information set
about conditions. They may not have had district-level data on
the conditions we consider at their disposal, and possibly may
use their own experiences or other, local sources of information
on conditions. We cannot rule out the case in which the policymakers’ information set better reflects conditions than do our measures. Nonetheless, we consider this an unlikely situation, as we
have incorporated a wide array of measures collected from both
satellite- and survey-based observations, and compiled this into
particularly powerful principal components.
A second explanation of our null findings is that policymakers
and local citizens have a different social welfare function than that
posited in our Conceptual Framework. For example, policymakers
and citizens may strongly prefer allocations that shift only slowly
over time because they may allow for less variability and more reliable longer-term planning for local governments and households
alike. Indeed, while there is some evidence from its Country Assis15
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allocation. Whereas other studies have identified the potential
for variation in implementation costs to explain the positive correlation between subnational wealth and aid allocation (e.g., Maiden
& Brockway, 2018; Briggs, 2021, 11), our study empirically investigates that possibility using data on project costs from World Bank
project documents. We find little evidence that underlying costs
are driving the observed differences in allocation across regions
of at varying levels of need. Future work should explore further
how variation in the burdens of providing development assistance
shape allocation decisions within countries.
One caveat is that, due to limited data, we cannot systematically
account for the activities of other donors at the subnational level in
modeling the World Bank’s allocation decisions. It is possible that
the decision to site projects in certain regions is shaped by strategic
considerations about how doing so will complement or reinforce
other development efforts. This is a question that is worth investigating as availability of geocoded data on aid project locations
extends to a broader set of donors. However, existing research suggests that donors often fail to coordinate their allocations at the
cross-national level (Aldasoro, Nunnenkamp, & Thiele, 2010), and
recent work suggests that this is largely true of donor behavior
at the subnational level as well. For example, in their analysis of
the case of Malawi, (Nunnenkamp, Sotirova, & Thiele, 847
(2016)) ‘‘do not find compelling evidence for increased aid specialization after the Paris Declaration, and the regional division of
labour among donors may even have deteriorated.” Other working
papers from Öhler (2013) and Nunnenkamp et al. (2016) report
similar findings in the cases of Cambodia and Uganda, respectively.
Still, to consider the possibility that donors are strategically
coordinating their aid in ways that would affect our core results,
we examine the case of Nigeria, which is the only of our cases that
crosses the IDA threshold in our sample for which we have geocoded data from multiple donors using AidData’s Nigeria AIMS
Geocoded Research Release, Version 1.3.2 (AidData, 2016). The
majority of geocoded locations are coded at the ADM1 level in this
data set (58%), so we aggregate project location codings up to the
ADM1 level. For each ADM1-level region in each year, we measure
(1) the number of new projects that were started by the World
Bank and (2) the number of projects started by any other donor
or combination of donors in the data set. Table 16 in the Appendix
reports the results of this analysis, which shows that the allocation
of other donors’ projects is not significantly correlated with the
World Bank’s subnational allocation of projects. We find that the
estimates are all near zero and change sign depending on the
model specification. This provides at least some limited evidence
that the World Bank’s behavior is not systematically driven by
the behavior of other donors. Finally, we note that, even if there
were strategic interactions between the Bank’s and other donors’
siting and allocation decisions, these interactions would have to
be very strong and pronounced in order to overcome the disproportionate siting of Bank projects (which represents a large share
of overall aid) in less poor areas. In other words, the Bank would
have to expect that other donors would allocate almost all of their
own funding toward the most poor areas in order to justify directing its own funding disproportionately to less poor areas.
Do our results based on countries’ transition to lower-middle
income status readily translate to countries that remain lowincome? Our findings complement the work by Briggs (2021)
and others whose samples do include many low-income countries.
By studying LMIC transitions, we also examine specific periods of
opportunity for major changes in aid strategies and allocations.
Finding little evidence of such changes in these opportune
moments suggests targeting is not likely improving rapidly outside
these periods. Our null results on efficient targeting also likely
extend to other multilateral and bilateral donors. In fact, if even
the WB – which is frequently seen as a particularly technocratic

We focus on an important but understudied margin on which
aid allocation decisions are made. The growing availability of geocoded data on donor-supported activities from AidData and other
sources provides rich opportunities for further research along
these dimensions. In particular, integrating the political economy
considerations and projected impacts derived from evaluation
work into realistic models of geographic allocation would offer a
particularly powerful direction for future work. Similarly, the
growth of funding from non-Western donors provides opportunities to explore whether these donors are more responsive to
changing budget constraints (or to changes in funding from Western donors). It is important to note that this work was facilitated
by the use of GeoQuery, allowing the researchers to integrate subnational data. GeoQuery’s primary source of vector data is geoBoundaries, an online, open license resource of geographic
boundaries, which are easily accessible for public usage and provides administrative zone information for nearly all countries at
the ADM0, ADM1, and ADM2 levels (Goodman et al., 2019). To
the authors knowledge, the geoBoundaries dataset is the only global administrative database that is provisioned with a full quality
assurance procedure (Runfola et al., 2020). While geoBoundaries
builds on numerous efforts within the geographic community to
establish high quality geographic data by preferencing the most
precise information available, the boundary files are not perfect.
Further improvements in geoBoundaries to expand higher levels
of granularity in administrative hierarchies, increase precision in
boundary files, and expand boundary data into a time series format
are critical to continuing to address concerns in data representation, processing and geovisualization of administrative divisions
(Runfola et al., 2020).
Our findings speak to numerous related studies. First, our analysis reinforces the existing findings by Briggs (2021) and others by
extending the set of indicators considered and applying an identification strategy from the cross-national aid allocation literature.
Across more than a dozen indicators of local need, we find very little evidence that changing a country’s IDA-eligibility status leads
the World Bank to shift its funding priorities in accordance with
need. Second, our approach parallels and complements findings
from the country-level aid allocation literature. Just as Collier
and Paul (2001) and Collier and Paul (2002) show that the crosscountry targeting of foreign aid departs from what an optimal efficient allocation would demand, our findings suggest that donors
allocate aid sub-optimally within recipient countries. This has
important implications for the aid effectiveness debate. Indeed, if
aid was allocated efficiently within countries, the misallocation
of aid (from a poverty-reduction standpoint) at the cross-country
level may be less worrisome. However, our results and the findings
of other related studies suggest that this relatively optimistic perspective may be unwarranted. It is important to note that although
optimal targeting does not guarantee optimal implementation
(e.g., Devahive et al., 2015) and a lack of optimal targeting does
not imply that aid cannot promote local development progress
(e.g., Dreher et al., 2021), it is a basic prerequisite for increasing
the overall efficiency and effectiveness of aid.
Third, we show the potential promise of employing identification strategies from the country-level allocation literature to
answer questions about aid allocation and effectiveness within
countries. Although we find mostly null results, this approach
should help increase confidence that our (null) findings are not
explained by unobserved confounders. At the same time, our findings suggest that scholars interested in studying the local effects of
aid on conflict may consider examining changing IDA-eligibility
status in combination with recent conflict fatalities as they try to
untangle the effectiveness of aid in reducing the impacts of conflict. Finally, our findings speak to and potentially complicate
debates over explanations for the observed rich-region bias in aid
16
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multilateral institution with documented targets and extensive
data at hand – appears not to target its aid efficiently at subnational scales, other donors may be even less likely to do so.
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Appendix A. Additional results
Tables 14–16

Table 14
Number of new locations in district.
Panel A
Conditions variable:
Crossed
threshold
Conditions
Crossed
threshold = 1 
Conditions
Observations

(1)
Area of district

(2)
Total
population

(3)
Population
density

(4)
Nighttime
lights

(5)
NDVI

(6)
Urban share

(7)
Cropland
share

12.58
(12.75)
0.941
(0.947)
1.017
(1.032)

12.77
(12.89)
0.904
(0.660)
1.346
(1.152)

12.36
(12.58)
0.000363
(0.000299)
0.000878
(0.000723)

12.76
(12.29)
0.0640
(0.0764)
0.145
(0.124)

11.78
(7.805)
0.00343
(0.00195)
0.0000630
(0.00185)

12.50
(12.13)
10.99
(12.34)
14.72
(22.06)

14.20
(12.42)
1.153
(4.567)
4.707
(2.942)

104960

104960

104960

104960

104960

104960

104960

(1)
Road dist. to
cities

(2)
Dist. to coast

(3)
Dist. to
waterway

(4)
Dist. to
petroleum

(5)
Dist. to gold

(6)
Dist. to
diamonds

(7)
Conflict
fatalities

(8)
Princ.
Comp.

12.96
(14.67)
0.00701
(0.00910)
0.00249
(0.00678)

13.00
(16.00)
0.00461
(0.00594)
0.00236
(0.00985)

13.97
(16.38)
0.0389
(0.0790)
0.0444
(0.101)

11.42
(12.81)
0.0150
(0.00938)
0.00246
(0.00527)

17.40
(17.59)
0.00437
(0.00773)
0.0156
(0.0156)

16.98
(17.11)
0.00129
(0.00289)
0.00732
(0.00729)

12.82
(12.67)
0.0849
(0.316)
43.16***
(2.537)

12.17
(12.58)

Panel B
Conditions variable:
Crossed
threshold
Conditions
Crossed
threshold = 1 
Conditions
PC 1

1.072
(1.748)
0.0557
(1.726)
1.513
(1.744)
0.675
(1.777)
1.846
(3.456)
0.0563
(0.951)

PC 2
PC 3
Crossed
X PC1
Crossed
X PC2
Crossed
X PC3
Observations

104900

104960

104960

104960

Standard error clustered by country and year in parentheses. *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1.
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Table 15
New Infrastructure Project in District?
Panel A
Conditions variable:
Crossed
threshold
Conditions
Crossed
threshold = 1 
Conditions
Observations

(1)
Area of district

(2)
Total
population

(3)
Population
density

(4)
Nighttime
lights

(5)
NDVI

(6)
Urban share

(7)
Cropland
share

0.00144
(0.00611)
0.000914
(0.000750)
0.0000294
(0.00119)

0.00314
(0.00734)
0.0101***
(0.00158)
0.00882***
(0.00223)

0.0000857
(0.00595)
0.00000346
(0.00000176)
0.00000422
(0.00000245)

0.000131
(0.00574)
0.000421
(0.000216)
0.000281
(0.000290)

0.0163
(0.0113)
0.00000165
(0.000000845)
0.00000381
(0.00000203)

0.000383
(0.00580)
0.0413
(0.0202)
0.0372
(0.0266)

0.000605
(0.00731)
0.00751
(0.00661)
0.00455
(0.00955)

105140

105060

105080

105140

105140

105120

105120

(1)
Road dist. to
cities

(2)
Dist. to coast

(3)
Dist. to
waterway

(4)
Dist. to
petroleum

(5)
Dist. to gold

(6)
Dist. to
diamonds

(7)
Conflict
fatalities

(8)
Princ.
Comp.

0.00305
(0.00664)
0.00000929*
(0.00000409)
0.00000462
(0.00000598)

0.00633
(0.00662)
0.0000102**
(0.00000340)
0.0000124
(0.00000620)

0.00554
(0.00666)
0.0000720*
(0.0000301)
0.0000956*
(0.0000455)

0.00126
(0.00846)
0.00000707
(0.0000110)
-0.000000720
(0.0000117)

0.00976
(0.00774)
0.00000850
(0.0000127)
0.0000242
(0.0000141)

0.00198
(0.00977)
0.00000391
(0.00000692)
0.00000514
(0.00000780)

0.000737
(0.00626)
0.000836
(0.00147)
0.00199
(0.00335)

0.000535
(0.00582)

Panel B
Conditions variable:
Crossed
threshold
Conditions
Crossed
threshold = 1 
Conditions
PC 1

0.00459**
(0.00138)
0.00117
(0.00126)
0.00192
(0.00213)
0.00339
(0.00211)
0.00292
(0.00189)
0.00155
(0.00268)

PC 2
PC 3
Crossed
X PC1
Crossed
X PC2
Crossed
X PC3
Observations

104960

105140

105140

105140

105140

105140

103620

103500

Standard error clustered by country and year in parentheses. *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1.

Table 16
Donor coordination in Nigeria.
Dependent variable:
DV = N. World Bank projects
(1)

(2)

(3)

0.007
(0.019)
0.356  
(0.058)

0.014
(0.011)
0.014
(0.434)

0.005
(0.021)
1.098
(0.532)

Year dummies:
Region dummies:
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

No
No
289
0.0004
0.003
0.758 (df = 287)
0.126 (df = 1; 287)

Yes
No
289
0.695
0.672
0.434 (df = 267)
29.040   (df = 21; 267)

Yes
Yes
270
0.825
0.783
0.358 (df = 217)
19.710   (df = 52; 217)

Note:

p<0.1; p<0.05;   p<0.01

N. other donor projects
Constant
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